Abstract -In this paper we examine a new private key encryption algorithm referred to as CAST.
I. Introduction
The CAST encryption algorithm [11[21 belongs U, a class of private key block ciphers which are composed of substitution boxes (S-boxes) with fewer input bits than output bits. Recently, a software implementation of the CAST cipher has been developed for application in computer security products [3] . In 121, it is suggested that, with an appropriate number of substitution rounds, the CAST cipher is resistant to differential cryptanalysis [4] . In this paper, we show that the CAST proposed block ciphers, the CAST algorithm consists of a series of rounds of substitutions in order to achieve the "confusion" and "diffusion" principles suggested by Shannon [7] . The basic algorithm structure is illusuated in Figure 1 . The algorithm encrypts by dividmg the N-bit plaintext input block in half. The right halfblock, RI, is transformed by a round function F and then XORed bit-by-bit to the left half-block. L1. The right and left halves are then swapped. This is repeated for the number of rounds in the cipher. R. Consequently, the algorithm may be viewed as the following iterated operation:
This format is identical to all so-called DES-like ciphers. The novelty of CAST is Ihe round function F.
The round function is implemented using S-boxes of dimension m x n where n = N / 2 and m < n.
The example CAST system presented in [2] uses four 8 x 32 S-boxes to implement a W i t block cipher. The inputs to the four S-boxes are determined by XORing a 32-bit sub-key' Ki to the right half-block and then dividing the half-block into four &bit groups. The 32-bit outputs of the four S-boxes are XORed togethet to produce the output of the function F . Letting Si ( X ) represent the 32-bit output of the j-th S-box given an &bit input X, the operation of the round function may
where R.,") is the j-th byte of R, and KP) is the j-th
In the following section we consider the application of linear cryptanalysis to the CAST algorithm.
(2) j=1 byte Of Ki.
Linear Cryptanalysis of CAST
Linear cryptanalysis [5] is one of the most powerful attacks on private key block ciphers. It has been shown that DES is theoretically susceptible to the attack using 247 known plaintexts.
To auack a block cipher using a basic linear cryptanalysis technique, the cryptanalyst is interested in the best lincar approximation of the form:
Let the probability that equation (3) It is obvious that NL can be increased by decreasing l p~ -1/21. Hence, selecting S-boxes for which pc -1/2 will clearly aid in resisting the attack. As well, increasing the number of S-box terms, a, involved in the system linear approximation, increases the numbex of known plaintexts required in the cryptanalysis. Consider the following nonlimarity measures based on the Hamming distance to the nearest afhe functiolts Let the distance between two m-bit functions, f and g, be given by Then the nonlinearity of an m-bit boolean function f is defined to be where t is the set of all m-bit af6ne boolean functions. The nonlinearity of an m x n S-box S is given as the minimum nonlinearity ova all non-zen) linear combinations of the S-box output functicars: 
Selection of Highly Nonlinear

S-boxes
In this section we discuss the likelihood that a CAST cipher designer can find s-boxes which satisfy a suitable level of nonlinearity. The design procedure outlined in [21 for constructing S-boxes involves the use of maximally nonlinear "bent" functions for the n output functions of the S-boxes to ensure high nonlinearity for the individual output functions. It is further recommended that the designer verify the nonlinearity of the S-box by checkmg all linear combinations of output functions.
In the following analysis we shall examine the likelihood of an m x n s-box being selected which will display good nonlinearity of N(S) 2 2m-2. Specifically, for a &bit cipher, from the development of the previous section, we are interested in the generation of 8 x 32 S-boxes which have N(S) 2 64. To make the analysis tractable we shall assume that the 2" functims generated from considering the linear combinations of the n S-box outputs are all randomly generated and independent. Hence, we ignore the constraints of using bent functions and that the 2" functions are derived from a set of n function^.^ Given a function g, consider the probability of ran- -2m-2)(2n-2m-a) .
It can be shown that, for reasonable values of m, the probability of d(f, g) < 2m-2 is bounded as
Since any two linear m-bit functions are exactly a distance of 2"-l apart, the events that a function f is less than a distance of 2m-2 from two different linear functions are muwally exclusive. Hence, P ( N ( f ) < r 2 )
where p = 2m+1. P(d = 2m-2) and we have used the fact that there are 2"'+l m-bit affine functions. Finally, in our analysis we use the assumption that the 2" functions determined from all linear combinations of the n output functions of an S-box may be considered independently in an analysis of their nonlinearities and that the probability distribution of the nonlinearity of each function is the same as that of a randomly generated function. As a result, the probability that an S-box has a nonlinearity that is less than or equal to 2m-2 is given by P(N(S) < 2m-2) < 1 -(1 (16)
Assuming that 2" -p << 1, this may be approximated by (17) P ( N ( S ) < 2-2) 5 2" * p.
Consider the CAST algorithm with m = 8 and n = 32.
In this case. from (13). P(d = 64) k: 2-s2. Therefore, p w 2-43, resulting in P(n/(S) < 64) 5 2-". Hence, we expect at least 99.95% of all randomly generated 8x 32 S-boxes to have nonlinearities of at least 64. This implies that most S-boxes have suitable nonlinearities and, therefore, selecting candidate S-boxes and then screening those candidates to eliminate any with low nontinearities as suggested in [21 is a masonable S-box design procedure.
Iv. Summary
Our analysis of the CAST encryption algorithm has determined a theoretical bound on the security against linear cryptanalysis given the minimum nonlinearity of the S-boxes used. The results suggest that a €&bit CAST cipher with a W i t key based on 8 x 32 S-boxes is secure against linear cryptanalysis with a moderate number of rounds. Further analysis suggests that sufficiently nonlinear S-boxes are easy to find by simple random generation. We conclude that consauction of efficient block ciphers resistant to linear cryptanalysis is straightforward using the CAST encryption algorithm design procedures.
